American Foreign Policy PS123 / PACS 130

Recommended: You may want to SKIM these articles in preparation for your assignment:

Week 2 (Jan. 25) Group Identity and National Identity: The Social Pshchological Perspective
Assignment 1: personal ethnohistory due

The readings for this week focus on group loyalty and the relationship between group loyalty and national loyalty. Please consider the overall question: Why do feelings of loyalty to one group generate negative or hostile feelings toward other groups?

or consider it this way: "are we as a human species somehow hardwired with xenophobic tendencies" because of:
our need for a collective or group identity, our need for identity with groups of people who are similar to us, our in-group biases and loyalty, a strong propensity to stereotype other groups, and a propensity to shut out discrepant information that might threaten our identity, etc. ?

We should also critically evaluate this literature: Here are some questions to consider as you read:

Week 3 (Feb. 1) Group Identity, Exclusion, and conflict: The Primordial Perspective

The readings for this week suggest that the forces of globalization will NOT prevail—some even say that they SHOULD not prevail. Even if the nation-state would disappear, they say that humans “naturally divide into groups, whether those groups be “civilizations,” “ethnic and racial groups,” or “religious” groups. Those groups, like the nation state will be exclusive—that is, will exclude other groups, and stigmatize them

Last week we began by making a flow chart about the steps in a social-psychological argument about why identity groups come into conflict. Druckman argued that it all begins with our need for belonging, our need for a group, rather than just an individual identity, and an in-group bias and in-group loyalty which leads to group cohesion. That, however, shuts out information about other groups, leading us to create stereotypical images of our own and other groups.

The readings this week focus on how we stigmatize members of "out groups" and how we exclude them; there are different forms of exclusion, some of which lead to violence.
1. Kurzban an Leary make a "primordial" argument that starts with a need for evolutionary adaptation in order to survive. Please create a flow chart that traces the steps in their argument.
2. Their argument differs from Druckman's argument in a major way and shows how group identity can more directly lead to conflict. What is the basic difference between them? What is your critique of their argument?
3. When you read Gamson's argument, please focus on the first part, just up to p. 11 ending before "The Dilemmas of Identity Politics" Gamson is making a constructivist rather than a primordial or evolutionary argument. He is talking about HOW stigmatization and exclusion can lead to conflict, not why. We will talk about the difference between these two types of arguments. What do you think that the main difference is?
4. According to Gamson, what are the conditions necessary for genocide?
5. In what ways are direct and indirect exclusion radically different?
6. Huntington is also offering an explanation for cultural (which he calls civilizational) conflict. He wrote the article over 20 years ago. Does it ring true today? what is your critique of his argument?
7. Please outline the steps of his argument in a flow chart.
8. What is your critique of his argument? If you think he is right, why? If you think he is wrong, why?

Week 4 (Feb. 8) The Political Economy of Ethnic and Religious Conflict: A Constructivist Perspective

Rogers Brubaker: Ethnicity without groups. European Journal of Sociology (2002), 43:
163‐177 (177-185 is a case study of Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania for those interested)

Provide examples of how this week’s readings could offer analytical tools in the process of formulating your research question? Do readings from the primordial or social-psychological perspective offer better/more interesting tools?
Name a few examples of Brubaker’s 6 modalities that make religion a particular cause of conflict and violence.
What is your critique of Brubaker’s argument in “Religious Dimensions of…”
Brubaker says: “We need to break…with the point that ethnic conflict involves conflict between ethnic groups.” What is Brubaker’s argument in “Ethnicity without Groups?” Do you buy it? If so, why? If not, why not? How does it contradict arguments from previous readings from the social-psychological or primordial perspective? Would he say the same about religious conflict?
Here are some terms from this week’s readings that you should know: ethnopolitical entrepreners, cultural entrepreneurs, politicized ethnicity, identity politics, framing, state-shrinking, ascriptive resource allocation, links between globalization and cultural conflict, illiberal democracy, diaspora community,

Week 5 (February 15) Why are some ethnic and religious conflicts violent and others are not?

As you all articulated in the discussion last week, constructivism can have a “so what?” quality about it. Primordial explanations for cultural conflict also have a “so what?” quality. As Willa pointed out, constructivist views are only valuable if they can be translated into applications in the field. I would agree with Gamson and others that primordial explanations for ethnic and religious violence can be dangerous if they are applied to explain particular conflicts, because they lead to views that nothing can be done and reconciliation is not possible.

1. how can constructivist explanations (Laitin and Fearon, Zimbardo, and Brubaker in particular--but you can bring in others) be broken down so that they can actually be useful in analysis? Could primordial explanations be broken down in the same way?

2. Laitin and Fearon argue that violence/conflict constructs ethnic identities in more antagonistic and rigid ways than they would otherwise be and that antagonistic and rigid identities increase support for elites who provoked the conflict. Was there evidence of this in Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment? (looking at prisoners and guards as a metaphor for different cultural groups) Can you see evidence of this in the real world? Come up with some examples

3. In your own paper for this class, how could the readings for this week provide an analytic focus for your own paper? (you can incorporate your thoughts about this in your paper revisions) Think about the following (you do not have to address all of these points, just the ones that seem relevant):

Week 6 (February 22) Consequences: The Refugee Crisis, Terrorism, The Rise of Political Opposition, and More

Assignment 3: Alternative Approaches to answering your research question Due (no length requirement)

When you finish the assignment, watch the film: "In this World" (2002), a docudrama following a refugee/migrant (which one?) from Pakistan to London

Week 7 (March 1) Resistance and Conflict Resolution

a. Can complicated issues be fixed by these simple solutions? What if the solution isn’t known, such as what to do about the division of a state in the former Yugoslavia (Franny). Or what if the sin is contested, ie competing claims to the same land?
b. What are other possible solutions to this issue?

2. How did the French mandate impact Lebanon and Syria? (similarities and differences) Did they perpetuate pervasive ethnic favoritism?

3. What major differences between Lebanon and Syria in terms of societal structure does Rosiny outline in his article and what is their impact?

4. Several quantitative studies of the late 1990s assessed Lebanon’s likelihood of ethnic conflict to be much higher than that of Syria. Now the opposite seems to be the case, drawing on Rosiny, why do you think such unexpected developments have taken place?

(This is particularly visible in Tatu Vanhanen’s study on Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism, which predicted in 1999 that Lebanon would have a likelihood score of 82.3 for the outbreak of ethnic conflict, while attributing a ‘mere’ 42.1 to Syria, ranking much lower than Lebanon and other countries experiencing relative stability today , such as Macedonia (64.0), Canada (47.4) and Quatar (62.2) (Vanhanen 69ff.).

5. How has the post independence “politicization of communal identities” been expressed differently in Lebanon in Syria and how has each state dealt with the ethnoreligious communities ?

6. How relevant are the socioeconomic cleavages emphasized by Rosiny to the aggravation of sectarian tensions in Syria?

7. Can we simply argue that Lebanon’s government supports and perpetuates ethnic entrepreneurs while Syria’s regime attempted to suppress it?

8. What is the impact of differing political structures on the outbreak of violence?

Critical assessment:
1. Rosiny assumes that the violence in Syria has taken on a sectarian nature, do you agree? If we question this assumption, does that mean Taif cannot be applied to Syria?

2. Rosiny discredits all alternatives to a Syrian Taif, do you agree with his arguments?

4. Does Confessionalism , the form of consociationalism, visible in Lebanon impose religious and ethnoreligious identities onto its citizens ? Should ethnoreligious identity be institutionalized? Where is the national element?

From “The people want the fall of the regime” to “Christians to Beirut, Alawites to their graves!” –
5. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic as well as Rosiny warn of the risks of a retaliatory genocide against Alawites. How do you assess this risk?

6. How would a Syrian Taif fix what appears to be deeply engrained hatred? Can trust be re-established simply through institutional reform?

1. What does Kaufmann describe as the paradox of intermingled populations in ethnic civil wars?

2. What is the difference between Kaufmann's arguments and Muller's arguments in "Us and Them"?

3. What are the assumptions on which Kaufmann must rely in order for his thesis to remain valid?

4. Kaufmann asserts that competition for loyalties in ethnic conflict is not an issue since ethnic identities are fixed at birth. What would primordialists say to this? What would Brubaker say?

Heather Dubois, "Religion and Peacebuilding," Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace, Spring 2008 (James and Iffat)

1.) What is the difference between a narrative and a metanarrative? Is there an American metanarrative? Is it conscious or unconscious?

2.) Auerbach proposes this framework to further empirical research on how to end identity conflicts. However, how might this be studied given that there are so many conflicts that are ongoing? How should we implement this proposal?

3.) Auerbach's rhetoric often undercuts Palestinian perspectives without sources of reference except Israeli ones, while the Israeli perspectives she includes offer diverse perspectives and do have sources. Does she already have an agenda? Are there other explanations for this?

4.) Auerbach also includes other identity conflicts to make her argument, including issues with the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the Sino-Japanese War. How does this compare to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has now been described by activists as apartheid? (In asking this question, it must be noted that this paper was published in 2009.)

5.) Let's discuss the background and narrative Auerbach is speaking from. Is she guilty of also writing this proposal with a metanarrative to inform her biases?

6.) The final outcome of the pyramid is only an idealistic possibility, according to Auerbach, but the proposal itself ultimately asks for both sides of a conflict to humanize (or perhaps, rehumanize) their adversary. What can we make of this if she implies that this is not possible? Or is it possible (with research)?

7.) Auerbach synthesizes "warm" and "cold" approaches at reconciliation in her proposed framework, how does she do this? What elements is she incorporating?

8.) Auerbach implies that the interwoven reality of material and identity conflicts are representative of a Weberian world. How, or why? Is this always true? (Note: Weber's 3-component theory of stratification: 1. wealth, 2. prestige, 3. power.)

9.) How does Auerbach explain "chosen trauma" in the narratives of Palestinians and Israelis? (p. 297) How does this relate to the idea of "time collapse" from Volkan? (p.301)

10.) "'Our' benign and conciliatory actions are attributed to our good and peace-loving nature, while our allegedly aggressive actions are portrayed as necessary reactions to the other's provocations. The same is used to explain the other's behavior. 'Their' benevolent actions are imposed by circumstances (e.g., international pressure), while malevolent behavior stems from their inherent wickedness and belligerence." (p.300) How can we relate the above quote to foreign policy in the United States? Of other nations? How does dehumanization other groups of people play out in media coverage?

11.) Auerbach's pyramid doesn't seem to include the dynamics hierarchized power structures (e.g., privilege versus disenfranchisement, polarity, representation), and assumes that two sides of an identity conflict equally capable of reaching out to the other. How might her proposal change if we shed more light on this?

Week 9 (March 15) Illustrating Explanations and Solutions: African Americans and "ethnic conflict" in the United States: Exclusion, Identity Politics, Political Entrepreneurs, and Organization

Assignment 4: Revised Research Question/ alternative approaches Theory/lit review due (7-10 pages)

Human Rights Watch, Report on Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) Read: TEN YEARS LATER
(Added April 1, 2004), INTRODUCTION (read through "The Structure") and HISTORY (through "The Single Party State")

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2015/09/rwanda-hatred-reconciliation-150929140405404.html